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PANEL DISCUSSION
IMPLICATIONS OF GROWTH THEORY FOR
MACRO-POLICY: WHAT HAVE WE
LEARNED~
Abel M. Marcus*
We are witnessing, in the second half of this century, an unprece-
dented wave of growth across the world. The experience of the East Asian
and OECD economies has proved that real convergence can be achieved
within a few decades. However, the welfare and technological gap
between the developed and the least developed countries continues to
widen, even as large sections of the world economy have recently joined
the international trading system.
Confronted with the extraordinary amount of quantitative and
institutional data amassed by statistical and, case studies, we need
theories to interpret these phenomena. Economists of the "old" and
"new" growth theories have gone a long way in explaining why some
countries grow faster than others, but I believe that any model that could
explain such a variety of experiences would have to be quite complex.
Otherwise, we would already have discovered the "recipe for making
miracles," as Lucas (1993) has wisely reminded us, and countries around
the world could already have applied such a simple model. I will attempt
here not to review models of growth theory, but to underline some of the
most important traits of the theory that are relevant for macro-policy. Let
me begin by reviewing some assumptions about growth and technology
that seem to come out of the recent flurry of empirical work.
First, technological progress is of overriding importance in explain-
ing growth in developed economies, while most of the growth in developing
countries takes place through human and physical capital accumulation
that incorporates ideas, products, or processes transferred from the more
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advanced countries.1 A recent World Bank study by Nerhu and Dharesh-
war (1994) estimates the factors contributing to growth for about one
hundred countries in the post-World War II era. The average growth rate
of total factor productivity for developing economies is a mere 0.07
percent per annum, while for developed economies it is 1.7 percent.2
Second, one of the most important relationships is that between GDP
growth and the accumulation of human and physical capital. I believe
that the failure of some studies to detect any important channel of
causation from exports (or outward orientation) to growth reflects the fact
that external trade acts not directly on the "growth residual" or growth in
total factor productivity but through the embodiment of new technolo-
gies and new products in the economy, and is thus complementary to the
accumulation process.
Third, technological leadership persists secularly. The United States
overtook Great Britain in the late 1800s and it has maintained its
leadership since then. As of 1990, the technologically closest competitors
(Germany and France) could produce only 80 percent of U.S. output
using the same measured inputs (Lau 1996). However, the OECD
countries have narrowed the technological gap significantly since World
War II.
And fourth, technical progress augments both physical and human
capital. All three assets complement each other.
Two types of models are relevant to our discussion: first, a model of
the growth process of a small open economy. Such models explain
growth in terms of human and physical capital accumulation and in
terms of shifts in the production efficiency frontier as a "quality ladder"
or "expansion of varieties," generated by inventions, by the external
effects of human capital, and by "learning by doing." In all such models,
1 This has led some authors to describe East Asian growth as less than miraculous. In
fact, recent empirical studies carried out by Young (1993) and Lau (1996) have confirmed
that total factor productivity growth for these economies is not higher than the world
average (and even null, for certain cases). But this should not distract from the basic fact that
the Asian Tigers have converged at an unprecedented pace in the past three decades.
Indeed, most of their growth is due to human and physical capital accumulation combined
with the right policies: outward orientation and macroeconomic stability. Recent evolution
has proved wrong the prediction of a slowdown in the Asian Tigers because of the law of
diminishing returns. Singapore and Hong Kong have been developed cotu~tries for some
time, and their growth rates continue to be among the highest in the world. The others,
although entering the league of developed economies, also have not experienced a decrease
in growth rates. The reason is that these economies, all small, have already established
themselves as technological leaders in some niches and thus have started to generate
technological progress themselves (Mateus 1995 and references therein).
2 The same conclusion is reached in several studies by Lau (1996) and associates. Using
a translog, they have found that physical capital is the most important factor of growth in
developing countries and, jointly with human capital, much more important in developing
than in developed economies. While local scale economies are important for developing
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the interaction between exports and technological diffusion is fundamen-
tal to a productivity increase in the domestic economy. This will be dealt
with in the first section of this paper.
The second type of model is concerned with the international
diffusion of technology and the convergence process. These models stress
the importance of innovation and growth in the developed economies
and the diffusion of inventions and new techniques to the follower
economies. With the tendency for transfer costs to increase, the rate of
convergence would decelerate as economies become more developed.
This will be dealt with in the second section.
The third section will consider some aspects of globalization and the
transfer of tecl’mology. Then I will refer to some other macro-policies that
underlie the productivity of technology, and in the final section I will
offer some conclusions.
GROWTH OF A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY AND
MACRO-POLICIES
Most recent studies show that growth takes place through external-
ities generated by human capital accumulation, by the resources dedi-
cated to R&D activities, and by the "learning by doing" effects that occur
in the production process. Growth can occur with the expansion of
existing production, the introduction of new goods, improvements in
quality, or an increase in varieties.
Here we rely heavily on the contributions of Grossman and Helpman
(1991a and b), Stokey (1991), and Young (1991). A fast-growing economy,
with a technology consistent with a "growth miracle," is one that
accumulates human capital--knowledge--at a fast pace, and uses that
knowledge to build and operate private physical capital and infrastruc-
ture.3 Such an economy succeeds in concentrating its work force on the
production of goods that are near its own quality frontier and, thus, in
accumulating human capital rapidly, through the high learning rates
associated with new activities and through the spillover of this experience
to the production of still newer goods.
Because human capital accumulation takes place primarily in
schools, the quality of and time allocated to the formal schooling of the
labor force are the essential elements. Several studies have demonstrated
that all the other activities that augment human capital (learning by
doing, health, nutrition, research activity, "openness of mind to innova-
tion") are related to the general literacy and numeracy of the population.
3 Singapore is an interesting case in this regard. Several economists have considered
that despite its high growth rate, the lack of total factor productivity growth observed in the
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Obviously the learning process will occur at a faster pace if a society can
benefit from world knowledge and "best practice technologies" so that
workers and managers move up what Grossman and Helpman call the
"quality ladder," continuously taking on new tasks and new processes.
To import advanced capital goods and technologies and interact with
more demanding markets requires that the economy be a relatively
large-scale exporter. In other words, in order to start a "growth miracle,"
the economy must experience a large disparity between the mix of
relatively sophisticated goods produced and the mix consumed by the
local population, a difference that could even widen over time. A large
volume of external trade is, thus, essential to a learning-based growth
episode.4
Despite these deterministic theories, an important element of ran-
domness crops up in technological development. Not only are inventions
random, but so too are the outcomes of firm strategies to target a specific
product or process, which eventually reveals itself to be either a "leading
sector" or a "dead end." The United States and Japan have specialized in
industries that are dynamic in both technological development and
market impact, while Europe in the 1980s and 1990s has been unable to
develop such sectors, a failure that explains in part why Europe is lagging
in technological progress.5
Lucas (1988) and Krugman (1981) have shown that when an econ-
omy is too far apart in technological terms from others, it may never
converge. Worse, it could even lose welfare by external trade. The logical
consequence of Schumpeterian creative destruction has been witnessed in
full force (at present, with more destruction than creation) in the case of
the Eastern European economies.6 What would be the most sensible
macroeconomic policy for these transition economies? Revert to autarky?
Give production subsidies or impose tariffs on imports in the context of
an "infant industry" argument? As the next section will make clear, and
the experience of East Asian economies shows, there is no shortcut to
the process of institutional change and industrial restructuring required
4 Forms of technology transfer do not take necessarily the form of patents. A survey
carried out among entrepreneurs in East Asia has revealed that contact with final markets
(and marketing firms), imports of machinery and related technical assistance, reverse
engineering, and technical assistance among suppliers and subcontracting are all important
(Rhee, Ross-Larson, and Pursell 1984).
~ Microeconomic studies have revealed that open competition and large market access
and integration are important factors in this regard.
6 This most interesting historical experiment should be studied by the new develop-
ment economists. Not only do the factories in these countries demonstrate an abysmal
technological gap, but also these countries lack the institutions and economic fundamentals
(maeroeconomic stabilization) that are essential to put th6se economies on a path of
sustainable growth. Within our model, this would require the integration of those
economies into the international trading system, where the process of technology transfer
could operate.290 Abel M. Mateus
when integrating an economy into the international trade system. Indeed,
the new theories have shown that the process may be long and painful.
However, I do think that this result--the possibility of welfare
reducing trade--applies mainly to the manufacturing sector. It may
apply in the case of the Czech Republic and Poland or Hungary, but
not to Moldavia, Armenia, or Mozambique. In these latter cases the old
Heckscher-Ohlin theory of intersectoral resource-based trade would
apply, and the traditional pattern of specialization and welfare-enhancing
free-trade policies would be relevant.
The policy implications of all these theories put high priority on
human capital accumulation through formal schooling (universality of
primary schooling and large-scale secondary schooling), along with the
university and R&D activities required for invention and innovation.
Because of the non-rival character of knowledge, government action (for
example, subsidies or public organizations) to promote investments in
those areas can generally lead to outcomes that are superior to pure
decentralized market solutions. Patenting systems and property rights
protection are also essential to increased R&D.
Another important implication is the need for an open and highly
competitive market system to promote efficiency. In this regard, and to
facilitate technology transfer from abroad, external trade policies that
foster export growth and openness are essential.
INTERNATIONAL DIFFUSION OF GROWTH AND
MACRO-POLICIES
Sometimes overlooked is the fact that technological growth, the
"residual factor," is much more important in developed than in devel-
oping economies and, therefore, that the transition from a developing to
a developed economy requires the buildup of capacity for "leadership,
invention, and innovation" specific to that country, within the context of
comparative advantage. The developed economy has already built most
of its human and physical infrastructure, and most of its growth has to
come from technological progress. In industrializing countries, the accu-
mulation of human and physical capital is dominant, and the country
grows faster if it adopts the "best practice" available in the world stock of
knowledge. This theory has an important policy consequence: A devel-
oping country cannot become developed unless it builds the capacity to
invent and innovate on a scale that makes it a technological leader in
some sectors or subsectors.
In this context, long-term growth in developed nations must have
as its engine technological progress. Most such progress stems from the
private research that ~ihderlies commercial discovery, motivated along
Schumpeterian lines by the flow of profits that accrues to an innovator.
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secured by patents and property rights, to appropriate the benefits of the
research investment. Another, more limited form of progress takes the
form of "learning by doing," which improves techniques and processes
economywide, for example, by the spread of computers and automation.
Here we will follow mainly the work of Barro, Mankiw, and
Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995a and b). For
cross-country comparisons, the key element is that imitation typically is
cheaper than invention. Most countries therefore prefer to copy rather
than invent. Moreover, the relatively low cost of imitation means that the
typical follower grows relatively fast--assuming an outward-looking
society, alert to the new inventions and processes occurring randomly in
different places all the timeT--and tends to catch up to the leaders, given
favorable government policies and favorable returns to the introduction
of new technologies. As the pool of copyable material decreases, how-
ever, the costs of imitation tend to rise and the follower’s growth rate
tends to fall, unless the follower economy has already built in the
necessary capacity for invention and innovation,s Hence, in this model, a
pattern of conditional convergence emerges that seems consistent with
actual observations. A country that is a follower can avoid a deceleration
in its growth rate (as the case of Singapore illustrates) if it develops
enough technological capability to innovate and generate technological
progress.
An important distortion occurs in these models when agents in the
leader country have insufficient incentive to im~ovate because they do not
take into account the benefits to follower countries from an increase in the
pool of copyable ideas. This effect would be internalized if each innovator
in the leader country retained international property rights over the use
of her idea. This conclusion has been challenged by Helpman (1993). He
concludes that a stricter enforcement of international property rights
leads to loss of welfare to the follower countries and sometimes even to
the leaders. However, his results are derived from a model that puts too
much emphasis on a duopoly context and not enough on the impact of
expanding the frontier of world knowledge.
Once again, one of the most important policy conclusions is that
technological diffusion requires a fairly open world system, and an
economy will most readily reap the benefits of technological progress if it
maintains an outward orientation. Also note that the rate of technological
transfer usually depends on at least a minimum of human capital, and the
most advanced followers will copy the most advanced products. There is
7 In this regard, the experience of the East Asian economies is important.
8 This is the reason why the growth rate of countries such as Japan and Singapore did
not decrease substantially, even after they had achieved catch-up, But in Japan a deceler-
ation in the growth rate did occur from the ’80s to the ’90s, even if we abstract from the
impact of the business cycle.292 Abel M. Mateus
a continuum of imitators, by order of sophistication. So, developing
countries should start early to build their own capabilities for invention
and innovation.
The next section will develop further the importance of the phenom-
enon of globalization. We will discuss briefly the case for international
portfolio diversification and criticize some of the current policy stands
arguing for "fair trade."
GLOBALIZATION AND THE SPREAD OF TECHNOLOGY
An open system of free, market-oriented trade and a free flow of
ideas and technologies are essential to fostering world growth and real
convergence among nations. However, this conclusion has been hotly
questioned recently because of the impact of increasing globalization on
unemployment and the wage rates of low-skilled labor in developed
economies. What does economic theory have to add to the debate?
What would be the impact on the rate of innovation in the leader
countries of an expansion in the follower economies? ’This question is of
paramount importance in view of the ongoing access of large entrants
such as Russia and China into the world trading system. In a Grossman-
Helpman type of model, the impact most likely is positive.9 Greater
intensity of imitation will lead to a decline in the average length of time
that a firm in a developed country can expect to earn positive profits.
However, the profit rate enjoyed by industry leaders may be higher when
the developing area is larger.
Present levels of globalization are not high, from a historical per-
spective. In fact, trade, capital flows, and human migration are not much
higher, in relative terms, than the levels achieved before World War I.
What is new is the large drop in transportation costs, and the much more
efficient networks of telecommunications and computer technology.
Krugman (1996) has assessed the impact of the dramatic reduction in
transportation costs on globalization. He finds a convergence of real
incomes, in which peripheral regions gain rela.tive to the core regions.
This result is consistent with some of the hypotheses just discussed.1°
But even among developed countries, increased integration has
made several industries more "footloose" than ever; they all face fierce
competition with a much-reduced buffer for their competitive edge
vis-a-vis their rivals. Today’s technology can be accessed simply by
having skilled technicians with the necessary scientific training--hence
the frantic search for patent rights in order to secure royalties. Compar-
9 See, particularly, Grossman and Helpman (1991a).
lo This situation may apply to cases like the OECD versus the East Asian region, or
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ative advantage in these industries is kaleidoscopic (Bhagwati’s terminol-
ogy), because it will move across developed countries almost randomly.
Notwithstanding, several authors (for example, Obstfeld 1994) have
shown that financial globalization, which generates international risk-
sharing, can yield substantial welfare gains at the world level through
its effect on expected growth in consumption. We know that growth
depends on the availability of an ever-increasing array of specialized,
hence inherently risky, production inputs. Global diversification will
allow shifting the world portfolio from safe low-yield capital to riskier
high-yield capital. Using some simple and purely illustrative exercises,
Obstfeld estimates that the welfare gains accruing with international
technology transfer can reach 22 percent in Southern Europe and 43
percent in North America, 107 percent in South America, and about 270
percent in developing Asia and Africa. Purely financial integration can
add about 60 percent to North Europe, 100 percent in the Americas and
about 200 percent to the developing countries.
LONG-RUN FUNDAMENTALS: SELECTED
LESSONS ON FISCAL POLICY
Empirical studies have proved that economies do converge on a
conditional basis. In the Solow model "steady states" are defined by
saving rates, population increase, and rates of technological progress. In
the new theories, "steady states" depend on government policies, inter-
temporal discount rates, intertemporal marginal rates of substitution
of consumption, and other variables like the time required for human
capital accumulation, or various parameters related to external effects.
Among these variables we are going to select the ones more directly
related to macro-policies and thus controllable by the government.
It is often forgotten that innovation and diffusion take place in a
macro environment, and the profitability of these processes depends on
several important parameters that are controlled by macro-policy.~ The
rate of return of an R&D project, a new discovery in the productive
process, or a new plant using an imported technology, depends on
parameters like the marginal tax rate, the cost of private and public
capital, and direct and indirect labor costs. In their extensive work, Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1995b, ch. 12) find that after the accumulation of
human capital, the most important variables are the ratio of government
consumption to GDP, the black-market premium on foreign exchange,
and political instability. The first two relate mainly to fiscal policy and
trade policy. Thus, we encounter once again the same policies empha-
sized by international organizations and in several large-scale studies by
u For a simple model that touches on most of these policies, see Easterly et al. (1993).294 Abel M. Mateus
the OECD, the World Bank, and the NBER: macroeconomic stability and
trade liberalization.
This section will raise some medium-term issues related to those
policy parameters, in light of recent growth theories. Governments often
have been accused of following relatively myopic rules because they are
interested only in being reelected. But if we take dynamic consistency
seriously, a credible government (one that may be rewarded by being
reelected) is the one that can pursue growth-enhancing policies. Ideally,
an optimal policy should not only produce effects over the short term, but
shift the growth path towards a higher intertemporal welfare.
What are the implications of growth theory for the intertemporal
budget constraint? This problem is related to the calls for a balanced
budget over the cycle, as in the recent German proposal for the European
Monetary Union. Can we derive any guidelines for the structure of the
government budget? For example, what lessons have we learned in
Europe, with our high social expenditures and wage replacement ratios?
A major problem afflicting both Europe and North America is the
question of the solvency of the social security system. Have we taken the
challenge seriously? Is not our inability to learn some of the teachings of
modern growth theory hampering the ability of our economies to reach a
higher level of intertemporal welfare?
Blanchard-type models of overlapping generations suggest that public
debt crowds out the private stock of capital. In the case of overlapping
generations with an infinite horizon, Ricardian equivalence will not hold,
for a number of reasons. Thus, for all these reasons, over the long term,
a high and rising debt ratio would lower the long-term growth rate. A
large empirical study carried out at the World Bank confirms this result.
A 1 percentage point increase in the government surplus as a share of
GDP is associated with a 0.37 percentage point increase in per capita GDP
growth and a 0.24 percentage point increase in the investment ratio. An
interesting negative and significant correlation exists between per capita
growth and the variance of fiscal balances.~2 Studies carried out at the
European Monetary Institute have also shown that increases in long-term
risk premia are positively related to both debt r~tios and budget deficits.
The increase in gross public debt as a share of GDP from 38 percent in the
early 1970s to 70 percent in the mid 1990s in the European Union has had
a substantial impact on the slowdown of the economy.
These results underline the importance of the European Union
initiative proposing a "stability pact" within the future Monetary Union.~3
That proposal would require all countries to have balanced budgets over the
12 See Easterly, Rodriguez, and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994), p. 24.
13 The other purpose is to avoid "free-rider" and "bail-out" problems among Monetary
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business cycle but would allow the use of automatic stabilizers for stabili-
zation purposes. Similar proposals have also been voiced in the case of the
United States.
Budget Structure: Taxes and Expenditures
Using the neoclassical theory of public finance in a growth model
enables us to illustrate some results concerning the optimal level of the
public sector and the structure of taxes and expenditures. State activities
are essential for welfare, but when overproduced they can lead to a
substantial deceleration of growth, as various empirical studies have
shown. The level and structure of state activities depend on several
trade-offs: First, the provision of public goods can either increase societal
welfare (basic education, sanitation and public health, defense) or in-
crease the productivity of private activities (physical and human infra-
structure). Second, the activities that reinforce property rights increase
the expected rate of return and thus the probability of capital investment.
However, in order to finance production of public goods, the state has to
raise taxes, thereby distorting relative prices, decreasing the marginal
productivity of capital, and reducing labor income and savings, thus
decreasing the efficiency of the economy. Furthermore, some public
goods are subject to congestion, which lowers individual utility. We
could also consider the state’s redistribution activities that prevent
absolute poverty and partially correct skewed wealth and income distri-
butions. These trade-offs have been recently modeled in abstract terms.
The theory of project evaluation developed in the late 1970s and early
1980s has also recognized those effects, but apart from some interesting
applications by international organizations, the theory has been largely
neglected.
A wider use of consumption-based tax systems and a significant
reduction in the scale of the public sector, with more taxation of benefits
and better project and activity appraisals, together with better gover-
nance and more control over the number and behavior of beneficiaries,
would go a long way towards correcting most of the major fiscal dis-
tortions prevailing in our societies. Removing current distortions would
certainly enhance long-term growth substantially.
The Social Security Problem and the Costs of the Welfare State
One system that is clearly unsustainable on present parameters is the
social security system, not only in developed countries but in transition
economies and developing countries as well. The unfunded liabilities of
social security systems in most of the OECD countries are above 100
percent of GDP. These liabilities put an enormous burden on future
generations and could lead to unbearable indirect labor costs. (The World296 Abel M. Mateus
Bank has estimated that in some Eastern European countries, with the
present system, social insurance contributions could exceed 60 percent of
payroll in the near future.) Coupled with unemployment schemes that
create disincentives to work and other rigidities in labor markets, these
distortions have created very high levels of unemployment in Europe for
more than a decade. Increasing growth urgently requires reforms to
lower marginal tax rates on saving and investment and to increase the
incentive to work.
CONCLUSIONS
We can learn a great deal from theoretical models of growth as well
as from the economic experiments with macro-policies of recent decades.
From the interaction of these two fields, I would emphasize the following
conclusions. First, the policy advice of international organizations that
has centered on macroeconomic stability, trade liberalization, and mar-
ket-oriented policies and has emphasized the building of human capital,
seems to be vindicated by the new growth theory and by the current
spurt of growth in at least a part of the developing world. Second, the
potential for improving welfare through technological diffusion and
portfolio diversification on a worldwide scale is still enormous. Some
illustrative simulations show an increase in welfare of two to four times
in the developing regions of the world. Besides getting the ftmdamentals
right, however, realizing such benefits requires a continuous process of
building human capital, transfer of technology, and financial integration.
I believe that most of the problems witnessed in developed countries
can be resolved by domestic policies, and that blaming globalization and
"social dumping" is misplaced. Reducing unemployment in Europe will
require a more flexible labor market and cuts in the marginal rates of
taxation and other "welfare state" costs.14 Stagnant wages for unskilled
workers in North America could be addressed by more adequate
redistribution policies.15 Similarly, slow growth in Japan requires external
and domestic trade liberalization, side by side with cleaning up the
aftermath of the inflationary bubble of the earl); 1990s.
14 Tax wedges in 1991 were 39 percent for blue-collar workers in the United States, but
reached 60 percent in Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium. For white-collar workers, tax
wedges reach up to 90 percent and more in some European countries (data from the OECD,
Economic Perspectives, January 1993).
is Minford, Riley, and Nowell (1995) have proved, within the context of a model with
constant returns to scale and non-traded goods where comparative advantage depends on
endowments of immobile skilled labor, raw labor, and land, that technology transfer
enhances world welfare--improving the terms of trade of the OECD or North while raising
productivity in the "emerging economies" of the South. But they calculate, with reasonable
parameters, that the impact of that integration translates into skilled wages increasing in the
North by 1.6 percent per annum and unskilled wages falling by 2 percent per annum, which
is a pretty dramatic redistribution of income.IMPLICATIONS OF GROWTH THEORY FOR MACRO-POLICY 297
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